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Abstract
This manuscript examines the manifestation of total war in the Mexican Revolution and 
analyzes why such an extreme form of warfare occurred. “Total war” refers to a mass armed 
conflict that is unrestricted in the weapons used, the territory or combatants involved, and 
the objectives pursued, as well as involving the complete mobilization of civilian and military 
resources for the war effort. In the Mexican Revolution, this was expressed in three main 
aspects: the implementation of excessive force by and against combatants, the perpetration 
of extreme violence, whether intentionally or unintentionally, against non-combatants, and 
the appropriation of civilian resources, which damaged civilian livelihood and threatened 
resource supplies. The essay cites specific examples of these aspects of total war, including the 
use of chemical warfare, the deliberate murder of civilians by combatants, and the pillaging 
of civilian property. In analyzing various incidents of the Mexican Revolution, the author 
determines that there are several reasons for the manifestation of total war. These include the 
use of heavy weaponry, brutal military tactics, the extended duration of the revolution, and the 
ideological differences between revolutionary factions.
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Introduction
La Decena Trágica, or the “Ten Tragic Days,” was a period of extreme violence and 
wanton destruction that occurred in México City between 9 February and 19 February 1913. 
This event occurred in the midst of the broader seven-year armed conflict of the Mexican 
Revolution, specifically during the military coup instigated by counterrevolutionary forces 
intending to overthrow the reformist-minded government of Francisco I. Madero, leader of the 
populist revolt in 1910, and then elected president in 1911. As described by a New York Times 
article from 12 February 1913, which covered the third day of violence, “Fleeing citizens cut 
down. For hours big guns and rapid fires sweep streets of the capital. Witness of the fighting 
says bodies cover streets where fighting occurred. Shells wreck big buildings […] The food 
supply in the capital is low. There is no milk or bread to be obtained, owing to the military 
activity in the city and the outskirts” (“Madero Spurns Offer” 1).  
The events depicted in this article provide perfect examples of “total war” in the 
Mexican Revolution, a conflict not hitherto described in terms of total war proportions. “Total 
war” refers to a mass armed conflict that is “unrestricted in the weapons used, the territory 
or combatants involved, or the objectives pursued” (“Total War,” Oxford References) as well 
as involving the “complete mobilization of civilian and military resources and manpower 
[sic] for the war effort” (“Total War,” Encyclopedia Britannica). I describe the manifestation of 
total war in the Mexican Revolution through three main aspects: the utilization of extreme 
and unnecessary violence by and against combatants; the perpetration of violence—whether 
intentional or unintentional—against non-combatants; and the involvement or appropriation 
of the civilian resource supply for the war effort and the resulting toll it took on resources and 
civilians. 
This analysis will show that the Mexican Revolution should be conceptualized 
of in terms of its use of total war practices, and therefore provoke larger debates on the 
historiography of total war and its relation to revolutionary conflicts. World War I has 
traditionally been conceived of as the first mass armed conflict(s) to constitute total war, 
largely due to the mobilization of multiple global civilian economies and means of production 
for the war effort; the extremely high number of casualties inflicted upon both military forces 
and civilian non-combatants; the use of weapons and strategies intended to exact as much 
damage as possible upon the opposing force; and the worldwide scale of the conflict of 
World War I. However, while the Mexican Revolution was not an armed conflict on the scale 
of World War I, I argue that it constitutes an early conflict of total war proportions. It shares 
similar elements of warfare with that war: especially the level of violence enacted on both 
combatants and non-combatants (between one and two million deaths have been attributed to 
the direct and indirect damage of the Mexican Revolution), and the appropriation of civilian 
resources by belligerent forces. I was prompted to ask why the historiography of World War 
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I has traditionally emphasized the implementation of total war, while that of the Mexican 
Revolution rarely, if ever, has done so. While this comparison exceeds the constraints of this 
paper, I hope to establish future opportunities of this kind.
Background 
The Hague Convention 
The international Hague Convention of 1907 meant to define “the laws and customs 
of war on land” and bind all signatory nations to adhere to its code of conduct (Hague; 
ch. 4, art. 1). The Hague Convention of 1907 revised the earlier 1899 First Hague Peace 
Conference, which itself had been used to amend the laws and customs of war established 
by the Conference of Brussels in 1874 (International Committee of the Red Cross). Given that the 
Mexican Revolution began only three years after the Convention was signed, it became one of 
the first conflicts in which articles were applied; but the war also exemplifies challenges to the 
Convention its rules on just warfare. As will be seen, The Hague Convention articles did very 
little to prevent unjust actions as intended.
Articles One and Two of the Convention define which persons could be considered 
combatants, stating that if either militia or volunteer corps constituted forces of an army, then 
they were defined as combatants (Hague; ch. 4, art. 1). Additionally, if inhabitants of a territory 
armed themselves to protect against an invading force, they were considered belligerents 
(Hague; ch. 4, art. 2). Many of the forces in the Mexican Revolution were more or less unofficial 
armies, and some were composed mainly of conscripted men with little or no official military 
training. However, both cases provided above by The Hague Convention determine these 
men to be combatants: either they were considered part of “volunteer” or militia forces and 
thereby part of official armies, or if they had joined the conflict to protect their homes and 
families, they were considered active combatants. Therefore, both the federal and the various 
revolutionary forces in the Mexican Revolution were considered combatants in all cases. 
 The Hague Convention also defined certain methods of warfare as illegal and unjust, 
and defined them as actions of total war. These methods included “treacherously” killing or 
wounding opposing combatants; killing or wounding combatants who have surrendered; 
using “arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”; and the 
“destruction or seizure of the enemy’s property” (Hague; ch. 4, art. 23). Although what 
constitutes “treacherous wounding” or “unnecessary suffering” was not specifically defined, 
there were numerous instances in the Mexican Revolution in which one or more methods of 
excessive violence occurred. Articles 25, 28, and 46 state that “attacks and bombardments of 
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended are prohibited,” that pillaging 
under any circumstance is prohibited, and that family rights, human lives, and private 
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property must be respected and are prohibited from confiscation (Hague, ch. 4, art. 25, 28, 
46). These articles allude to the forced involvement of civilian life in a conflict; tellingly, they 
provide rules that were violated in the Mexican Revolution on multiple occasions. 
Antecedents to the Mexican Revolution
The Mexican Revolution began on 5 October 1910, with the proclamation of the Plan de 
San Luis Potosí by Francisco I. Madero. Madero delivered the call for revolution with the intent 
of overthrowing the presidency of Porfirio Díaz, a former general in México’s Federal Army 
who had ruled México almost without interruption for 35 years. Díaz, whose presidency and 
governmental regime was known as El Porfiriato, ruled México as a dictatorship; he instituted 
extensive economic and political policies that served to exploit the labor of the urban working 
classes and rural, Indigenous and Mestizo peasantry. These policies benefited México’s 
economic elite and Western imperial interests in the manner typical of the neocolonialism that 
defined much of Latin American politics and economics at the time. The words of Encarnación 
Acosta, a campesino (peasant) from the northern state of Chihuahua who joined the revolution 
at the age of 13, embody how Díaz’s policies disaffected working-class Mexicans:  
The landlord who oversaw our land would often taunt and debase my father. My father 
would only take so much of this abuse and tried to defend himself as a human with 
individual rights. The unfair landlord hit my father for being so outspoken. I ran to 
defend my father and this cold creature hit me down too. We took our complaint to the 
officials under Díaz, who, instead of being sympathetic, took our ranch along with the 
newborn harvest. (Kallas 247) 
Cases like these, where wealthy landowners and political officials collaborated in the 
exploitation and brutalization of campesinos, were commonplace during the Porfirian era. 
Díaz was able to rule unopposed for so long largely because of his use of “carrot-and-stick” 
measures, negotiating political and economic benefits for political opponents who accepted 
bribes, while physically or legally coercing those who would not submit to his rule. In doing 
so, he constructed a highly centralized state designed by Díaz’s científico (scientific) advisers, 
who advanced political and economic policies that worked to “modernize” México, establish 
a middle class, and create a coalition of industry and governmental elites under the banner of 
“Porfirismo,” the ideological doctrine of Díaz (Knight 1: 21-22). In addition to heads of industry 
and government, military leaders also were party to this coalition and ideology, due to Díaz’s 
fame as a general. 
Throughout the reign of El Porfiriato, various rebellions surfaced, typically originating 
in northern and central-southern states, and from the rural, peasant, and (often) indigenous 
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peoples there who held grievances with Díaz’s political and economic order. The northern 
states had a longstanding tradition of autonomy, or at least decentralization from government 
forces. This, together with histories of Indigenous resistance to Spanish and Mexican conquest 
(such as the Yaquis from the state of Sonora), as well as the desert and highland geography 
that favored concealment, all combined to foment rebellion (Knight 1: 115-116). In the south, 
hacienda-style agriculture and land distribution, which favored the wealthy landowning few 
over the poor and often Indigenous campesino masses, was the most significant drive of revolts 
against the governing forces (Knight 1: 79;82). In response, local and federal government 
officials called on the Federal Army to suppress these rebellions, frequently implementing 
brutal measures in doing so. For example, throughout the reign of El Porfiriato, the federal 
government engaged in a series of wars with the aforementioned Yaqui peoples, resulting 
in numerous recorded massacres of noncombatant Yaqui men, women, and children; this 
eventually culminated in the forced deportation of 8,000 – 15,000 Yaquis from their home 
territory in Sonora to southern Mexican states between 1902 and 1908 (Schmall). 
This history of political and economic oppression, popular revolt, and harsh military 
suppression influenced the development of the Mexican Revolution and the emergence of total 
war through its duration. In the words of Acosta, “I joined [the revolution] more by impulse, 
outrage, and revenge than patriotism […] While fighting the government soldiers I felt I was 
fighting against all injustices of all the landowners for their greediness and abuses of the poor” 
(Kallas 247; 250). Many of those who fought in the revolution did so to end oppressive rule. 
To accomplish this goal, they would often use any means necessary to ensure that the reign 
of injustice would end. By this reasoning, one can begin to understand why total war would 
come to define the Mexican Revolution. 
The First Phase of the Mexican Revolution: Popular Uprising
Madero achieved a popular revolution upon the pronouncement and promulgation of 
his Plan de San Luis Potosí in late 1910, primarily gaining his support from serrano (mountain-
dweller) movements in northern México, like those of Pancho Villa and Pascual Orozco in 
Chihuahua, which followed the traditions of past rebellions by focusing on enhancing local 
autonomy, advancing agrarian and economic reform, and combatting the centralization of 
government propagated under El Porfiriato. Madero gained additional support amongst 
agrarista (agrarian reform) movements in the south, like that of Emiliano Zapata, which, while 
following previous trends, were focused almost exclusively on land reform and achieving 
greater land repatriation for peasants Knight 1: 169). Madero and those who answered his call 
succeeded in overthrowing Porfirio Díaz in May 1911, with Madero elected as president of 
México in the following November election. 
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The Second Phase of the Revolution: Revolutionaries in Power
Although the second full year of revolution in México saw the advancement of free 
elections and restoration of constitutional rule that Madero promised in his Plan de San Luis 
Potosí, this progress was marred by growing discontent with his lack of substantial economic 
and social reform; his inability to commit to either the conservatives or the radicals vying for 
his support; and his decision to disband the revolutionary groups that helped him achieve 
power, instead relying on the military leaders and Federal Army that had fought against 
them during the uprising against Díaz. Thus, numerous rebellions emerged with the intent 
of overthrowing Madero and assuming control of the Mexican government. One was led by 
Emiliano Zapata, who turned on Madero in order to continue to fight for expanded agrarian 
reform. Another was headed by Pascual Orozco, who was discontented with Madero’s failure 
to advance radical policies, and felt that he had received insufficient recognition in helping 
overthrow Porfirio Díaz. Other, reactionary, revolts were led by various conservative leaders, 
such as Bernardo Reyes (a former general in Porfirio Díaz’s army and one-time political ally 
of Díaz), and Félix Díaz, Porfirio Díaz’s nephew, who desired a return to the “traditional” 
political and economic order that flourished under El Porfiriato (Knight 1: 289-333).  
First Aspect of Total War: Loss of Civilian Life 
La Decena Trágica and the End of the Revolutionary Government
Widespread civil discontent turned to terrible violence in February 1913 with La Decena 
Trágica. Following failed rebellions in both August and October 1912, respectively, both Reyes 
and Félix Díaz were aprehended by Federal forces and incarcerated in México City (Knight 1: 
481). Due to the continued influence of Porfirismo amongst the military and police command, 
Reyes and Díaz planned and instigated a coup from within prison with the assistance of many 
of the military forces stationed within the city, primarily those of Generals Manuel Mondragón 
and Gregorio Ruiz, career military men who served throughout El Porfiriato (Knight 1: 481). 
The coup began on the morning of 9 February, with an attack on the National Palace by a 
force of rebel Federal soldiers led by Díaz and Reyes. The attack was ultimately a failure, 
resulting in the death of Reyes and the forced retreat of the remaining rebel Federal forces to 
La Ciudadela, an old arsenal a mile and a half away from the National Palace (Knight 1: 482). 
Over the next ten days, much of the fighting would occur in this area. This first battle and the 
subsequent fighting in la Decena Trágica provides instances in which non-combatants were 
either intentionally or accidentally targeted by the warring factions, as well as supplementary 
examples of both excessive violence perpetrated by combatants and the destruction of civilian 
property. 
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Articles from three different news outlets, as well as historian Alan Knight’s The 
Mexican Revolution, are helpful in analyzing the events of la Decena Trágica. The first periodical 
source is the Mexican-based Regeneración, created by “los Hermanos Flores Magón,” three 
reporters during the period of El Porfiriato who were well known for their their socialist and 
anarchist beliefs, for their opposition to Porfirian politics, and for their resistance to censorship 
of the press. The second periodical source is the Mexican-American La Prensa, published in 
San Antonio, Texas which shows a more favorable bias towards the reactionary forces in its 
coverage of the events. The third periodical is the US-based New York Times, which doesn’t 
reveal a clear bias for either side in the conflict (but could potentially hold a more conservative 
bias, given the US government’s support for Porfirio Díaz and the economic interests of 
American investors and businessmen in México at the time). A New York Times article 
published on 10 February 1913 describes the outbreak of fighting in front of the National 
Palace on the first day of la Decena Trágica, stating that “[i]n this engagement, more than 300 
persons were killed. Most of them were non-combatants. A large crowd had gathered around 
the palace, and into the assemblage both sides fired” (“Army Revolts” 1-2). This version of 
the events is supported in the article from La Prensa, which reported that, “The assaulting 
troops gave several charges over the crowd that witnessed the fight, resulting in various 
deaths and injuries […] In the battle that the belligerents sustained in front of the Palace, it is 
calculated that there were around 200 deaths” (“El epilogo de la gran tragedia revolucionaria 
parece estar muy cercano” 1). Despite the differences in overall death toll, both accounts are 
further confirmed in Knight’s analysis: “For some ten minutes the Zócalo became a battlefield: 
Reyes was shot dead along with 400 others, many of them civilian bystanders” (1: 483). These 
accounts ultimately conclude that both the military rebels under Díaz’s command and the 
Federal soldiers under Madero committed violence against a non-combatant populace, a trend 
in the warfare that would be repeated in the coming days. 
The third day of fighting in la Decena Trágica saw combatants continuing to commit 
acts of violence against non-combatants, this time additionally destroying civilian property. A 
New York Times article covering the fighting noted that during the attack on La Ciudadela, “[h]
eavy artillery were used on both sides, and the firing was directed without regard to the non-
combatants in the streets or to the property of foreigners. The government losses are heavy. 
One estimate is over 1,000 killed and wounded [soldiers]. This is probably conservative. The 
loss among non-combatants is also heavy” (“Madero Spurns Offer” 1). Articles from both 
Regeneración and La Prensa further affirm this form of close-quarters combat within the city 
and the destructive effect it had on civilian life. Regeneración states that, “[t]ransformed into 
crazy [persons], into brutes, the men of the [Federal] army have divided into two bands and, 
spewing thousands of grenades and cannonballs, have left México City in ruins and murdered 
thousands of men, women, and children” (“El Gobierno Maderista ha Muerto” 1). Meanwhile, 
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La Prensa expresses that “[w]ith the bombardment of La Ciudadela, many private residences 
have been destroyed, causing the deaths of countless persons” (“El Epilogo de la Gran 
Tragedia Revolucionaria Parece estar Muy Cercano” 1). 
These articles could be seen as embellishing their narratives in order to serve either 
their own biases or the interests of their leadership. However, Knight’s description confirms 
the authenticity of these accounts, noting that “[o]n the morning of 11 February, government 
forces opened the attack on La Ciudadela with a massive artillery barrage (to which the rebels 
replied in kind) followed by waves of infantry; there were over 500 casualties, including many 
civilians” (1: 483). The evidence gleaned from all four accounts indicates that these weren’t 
mere accidental killings of a few non-combatant bystanders, but rather that both the Federal 
Army and the military rebels under Díaz’s command showed explicit disregard for the safety 
of nearby non-combatants, resulting in the deaths of many innocent people. The deaths of 
civilians caught in the crossfire provide insight into how the Mexican Revolution would 
eventually reach conditions of total war, and foreshadowed much of the escalation in violence 
and brutality that would be seen in the following years.
 Due to political dealings between Felix Díaz and General Victoriano Huerta (a high-
ranking general during El Porfiriato and a known associate of Reyes who had been appointed 
by Madero to lead the Federal defense during La Decena Trágica), as well as continued hostility 
from the reactionary elements of the Federal Army, Madero’s aspirational government was 
doomed to fail. On 19 February 1913, the 29th Battalion under command of Porfirista General 
Blanquet marched into the National Palace and arrested President Madero and Vice President 
José María Pino Suárez, ending Madero’s term as president and effectively establishing Huerta 
in his place (Knight 1: 487). Three days later, Madero and Pino Suárez were shot and killed 
while being transported to the Federal District penitentiary. Although the official report from 
Huerta’s government claimed that rebels attempting to liberate the two attacked the convoy 
transporting them, and that Madero and Pino Suárez were gunned down while attempting to 
escape, it is widely believed that Huerta simply had the two executed for posing future threat 
if left alive (“Huerta Promises” 1). Ultimately though, the revolution did not die with Madero’s 
murder: in the words of Renato Leduc, a Mexican journalist who worked as a telegraphist 
during the revolution, “[Madero’s] death started the real revolution” (Reed ix).
The Third Phase of the Revolution: Civil War
The period of the Mexican Revolution lasting from March 1913 to July 1914 involved 
a civil war between Huerta’s counterrevolutionary Federal Army and the newly emergent 
Constitutionalist Army, led by a coalition of Venustiano Carranza, Francisco “Pancho” Villa, 
and Álvaro Obregón. Carranza was the governor of the state of Coahuila, and following the 
assassination of Madero, he issued his Plan de Guadalupe in March 1913, which called for the 
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deposition of Huerta and the re-establishment of a democratic, constitutionalist government. 
Carranza was joined by Villa’s Division of the North and Obregón, a former rancher who 
had fought in the rebellions of 1912 and would become arguably the most celebrated military 
strategist and general in both the Constitutionalist Army and the Mexican Revolution as a 
whole. Most of the fighting between the Constitutionalists and the Federal Army in this period 
was concentrated in northern and central México, especially in the states of Chihuahua (Villa’s 
home state), Coahuila, Durango, Aguascalientes, Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, and Guanajuato. 
This period of the Mexican Revolution is typically characterized as one of the bloodiest phases 
of the revolution, and for that reason, much of my analysis will be drawn from the events of 
this period. Specifically, the battles of Gómez Palacio and Zacatecas provide prime examples 
of how the acceleration toward a year-long civil war led to escalations in the methods and 
brutality of the combat. 
Second Aspect of Total War: Superfluous Violence Between 
Combatants 
The Battles of Gómez Palacio and Zacatecas
Analysis of the Battle of Gómez Palacio, which occurred 22 –26 March 1914 draws 
from first-hand accounts of the battle. At Gómez Palacio, the Federal forces were able to wield 
around 10,000 soldiers, while the Constitutionalist forces, commanded by Villa, were likely 
able to employ between 7,500 and 10,000 soldiers (Knight 2: 143-145). Throughout Reed’s 
account of the battle, two known instances emerge in which Federal forces used poison as 
an attempt to wound or kill their opponents. The first is described in a conversation between 
Reed and a general:
“You see the water from these ditches comes from the river inside the town, so I thought 
it might be a Federal paper.” I took it from his hand. It was a little folded white piece 
of wet paper, like the corner and front of a package. In large black letters was printed 
on the front, “ARSENICO,” and in smaller type, “Cuidado! Veneno!” “Arsenic. Beware! 
Poison!” […] “A good many of the men have had bad cramps in the stomach, and I 
don’t feel altogether well. Just before you came a mule suddenly keeled over and died 
in that next field, and a horse across the ditch”[…] I explained to him that the Federals 
had poisoned the ditch. (Reed 234)
Later, Reed notes that “[o]n the very edge of this road, under a bush, was an earthen jar full 
of milk. ‘Poisoned,’ [a Constitutionalist soldier] said briefly. ‘The first company stationed over 
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here drank some of that stuff. Four died’”(Reed 238). Article 23 of The Hague Convention 
expressly states that the employment of poison or poisoned weapons is forbidden, and given 
that the Federal soldiers, being representatives of the federal government and being thereby 
bound to its signing of the Convention, committed poisoning, this case represents a clear 
violation of the Hague Convention and its prohibition of certain types of weapons and agents 
of warfare (Hague; ch. 4, art. 23). Given that at least four men were killed and many more 
wounded due to the use of this poison, the intent to grievously wound or kill the opposing 
belligerents is treated as though it were an acceptable aspect of warfare. Furthermore, given 
that the soldier in the account states that the water they found poisoned originated from a 
river inside the town, it can be surmised that a significant portion of the river was poisoned; 
this suggests the very possible danger of non-combatants consuming the water and suffering 
harmful effects or even death from its contamination. 
The Battle of Gómez Palacio culminated in prolonged attacks for the final two days of 
the battle on principal locations in the town of Gómez Palacio, known variously as the Lerdo, 
the Cerro, the Corral, and the cuartel. Reed describes a scene in which Constitutionalist forces 
advancing on the town were fired on with heavy artillery: 
They were opening upon the little line of climbing men with artillery! The ring of flame 
was broken now in many places, but it never faltered. Then all at once it seemed to 
wither completely, and little single fireflies kept dropping down the slope—all that 
were left […] That night they attacked the Cerro seven times on foot, and at every attack 
seven-eighths of them were killed.” (252)
This condition of warfare violates two of the components of Article 23 of The Hague 
Convention: the prohibition of murder and treacherous wounding of belligerent forces and the 
employment of arms, projectiles, or materials intended to cause unnecessary suffering (Hague; 
ch.4, art. 23). The effective use of artillery by the Federal forces against unshielded combatants 
represents employment of arms intended to cause superfluous injury and suffering. The added 
weight of each attacking force suffering the deaths of almost 90% of their men evidences the 
Federal forces’ flagrant attempt to massacre the Constitutionalist opposition. All in all, the 
Constitutionalists were able to emerge victorious at the Battle of Gomez Palacio, but suffered 
casualties in the figures of 1,000 men killed and around 2,000 men wounded; this further 
exemplifies the high stakes and brutality of this phase of the revolution (Reed 254). 
 The death blow to the Federal army and the end of this phase of the Mexican 
Revolution came on 23 June 1914, with the bloodiest battle yet: The Battle of Zacatecas. The 
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battle, which began on 17 June and ended on 23 June, involved over 20,000 Constitutionalist 
soldiers from Villa’s Division of the North and 12,000 Federal soldiers. As Knight describes it, 
at Zacatecas the rebels stoppered every outlet and subjected the fleeing Federals to 
withering enfilade fire. The defeat became a rout and the rout became a massacre. 
Maybe 6,000 Federals died: some killed when the public buildings and arsenal were 
dynamited; some—the officers—who could not escape summary execution […] All told, 
only a few hundred of the Federal garrison of 12,000 reached Aguascalientes; of the rest, 
maybe half were killed and half taken prisoner. (2: 168-169) 
Knight’s description of the Battle of Zacatecas provides several examples of how extreme and 
unnecessary violence inhered in this phase of the Mexican Revolution. The Constitutionalists’ 
attempt to stop all Federals from escaping and instead to murder them shows that they did not 
abide by the rule to solely incapacitate the enemy; rather, they attempted to exterminate the 
Federal army entirely. The casualty statistics for the Federals further support this, as at least 
6,000 Federal soldiers were killed in combat, and a further 3,000 were wounded, representing 
casualties of at least three quarters of the Federal forces stationed at Zacatecas (Knight 2: 168). 
Furthermore, the execution of captured Federal officers provides an example of how 
Constitutionalists violated The Hague Convention’s mandate prohibiting the mistreatment 
of prisoners. Instances exist throughout the revolution where armies, regardless of faction, 
mistreated and executed prisoners. During the attack on the National Palace in La Decena 
Trágica, fifteen military cadets and General Ruiz were captured and summarily executed by 
Huerta (Knight 1: 483). Though captured foot soldiers were executed during the first phase of 
popular revolt, the execution of a high-ranking officer like General Ruiz marked an escalation 
in the brutality of the treatment of prisoners. This escalation would be seen in the following 
period of civil war, especially amongst Villa’s Division of the North, who were well-known for 
murdering captured Federal officers in every battle fought against them (Reed 143). The case 
of Zacatecas, therefore, reflects the rule rather than the exception, and shows how a brand of 
unjust warfare that emphasized massacring one’s enemies and violating the rules of war had 
become the norm by the end of the first civil war. 
The Fourth Phase of the Revolution: A Second Period of Civil War 
The Battle of Zacatecas led to the resignation of Huerta as president on 15 July 1914, 
the arrival of Carranza’s and Obregón’s Constitutionalist forces in México City in early 
August (Villa’s Division of the North had retired to Chihuahua to protect its home territory), 
and the signing of the Treaty of Teoloyucán on 13 August, which required the dissolution 
of the Federal army and transferred the position of national government to the hands of 
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the Constitutionalists (Knight 2: 169-171). The Convention of Aguascalientes was called to 
reintroduce constitutional government, involving delegations from Carranza, Obregón, Villa, 
and Zapata, but quickly broke down due to politicking and differing plans for social and 
economic reform between the alliances of Carranza and Obregón, and Villa and Zapata. Civil 
war broke out for a second time in the Mexican Revolution, this time between Zapata’s and 
Villa’s Conventionalists and Carranza’s and Obregón’s Constitutionalists. This phase of civil 
war lasted from 1915 to 1917, and is characterized as one of the most brutal phases, largely 
due to the style of the warfare developed between the Constitutionalists and Huerta’s regime. 
By the end of 1916, the Constitutionalists would emerge as the new regime in power, having 
defeated the Conventionalists, forced Villa and Zapata to convert their forces into smaller 
guerrilla bands, and ended the period of mass armed conflict.  
Third Aspect of Total War: Exploitation of Civilian Resources
The third and final aspect of total war in the Mexican Revolution is the often-coerced 
involvement of the civilian sphere by different military forces, especially in relation to 
resources, supplies, and labor force. One of the first large-scale instances in which civilian 
resources were adversely affected by the fighting in the revolution occurred during the events 
of La Decena Trágica. The article from La Prensa covering the events of the third day observed 
that, after the artillery barrage on La Ciudadela, “[t]he city is found without lighting and a 
panicked terror overcomes the inhabitants. The electric streetcars don’t circulate, and only the 
ambulances working to collect the dead and injured pass through the streets” (“El epilogo de 
la gran tragedia revolucionaria parece estar muy cercano” 1). Instances like these are further 
corroborated by the New York Times article from the third day, which noted severe food supply 
shortages throughout the capital, and Knight’s account which stated that “[s]hells were lobbed 
across the city centre, machine-gun fire raked chic residential and commercial streets. The 
lamp-posts leaned, and festoons of telegraph wire draped themselves across deserted plazas. 
Rubble and corpses strewed the streets, and between them dodged ‘Buen Tono’ vans, acting as 
makeshift ambulances […] Fresh food became scarce, prices shot up, and some people—it was 
later said—dined on dog and cat” (1: 484). The failure of the city’s electricity, the dwindling 
food supply, and the loss of other civil services reveal how the strain on civilian resources 
became a central theme during la Decena Trágica, a theme which would be repeated and 
amplified as time went on and the revolution intensified.
A case from My Village During the Revolution describes specific instances in which the 
factioned armies came into villages and expropriated food supplies: “[t]he Constitutionalists 
arrived with their almost yellow uniforms, in search of wheat, and they unfortunately found it, 
put it in sacks, then took it away […] Then came the crude, hated Zapatistas in search of corn, 
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and they unfortunately found it, then carried it away” (Batalla 96). From the beginning of the 
revolution, it was common practice for armies to seek sustenance as well as lodging from the 
people whose territory they occupied. This style of accommodation might be coerced through 
the threat of violence, or might be requested but inadequately compensated with currencies 
whose use and value depended on the time, place, and person. The appropriation of housing 
and food supplies occurred throughout the entire period of armed conflict, for various reasons: 
as a way for an army to impose power and control over those they occupied; as the cost of the 
army’s “protection” of the people against other armed forces; and as the standard material 
consumption exacted by a large body of transient soldiers. Ultimately, whether Federal or 
independent, revolutionary or reactionary, all factions of the revolution engaged in the practice 
of confiscating or inadequately paying for the resources of the regions they occupied. 
In addition to food and lodging, transportation, communication, and real estate were 
also appropriated by Federal and revolutionary forces. By the civil war of 1913-1914, it had 
become common practice for retreating armies to destroy or impair railroads, telegraph lines, 
and other methods of transportation. These actions further damaged the ability of the vast 
majority of the Mexican population to utilize these essential resources, and given the lack of 
consistent administration and supplies to fix the damages, preventing many citizens from 
using such resources for months. Reed describes an instance preceding the Battle of Gómez 
Palacio: 
After an hour of riding we came to a piece of broken track […] It was an old destruction, 
probably a year old, made when these same Constitutionalists were retreating north in 
the face of Mercado’s Federal army, and we had it all fixed in an hour. Then on again. 
Sometimes it was a bridge burned out, sometimes a hundred yards of track twisted into 
grape vines by a chain and a backing engine. (Reed 193)
Cases of intentional destruction like this are noted by Knight and Reed, indicating that 
these weren’t isolated instances, but a standard practice of war that became more and more 
entrenched as the revolution dragged on.
Examples of more “forceful” forms of expropriation can be seen in the acts of pillaging 
towns and the theft of personal property, both of which had been expressly prohibited by 
Articles 28 and 46 of The Hague Convention. Such an instance of pillaging and confiscation 
of property is exhibited in Edith Henry’s memoir The Death of Frank Henry. The author recalls 
the invasion of the town of Zacualpan on the border of the states of Guerrero and Mexico in 
1916 by Zapatistas. During the invasion, the Zapatistas ransacked Henry’s house and pillaged 
both it and the rest of the town. Henry noted that “[t]hey tore off my wedding ring […] They 
demanded money and our weapons, and with the muzzle of a gun at my head I showed where 
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the other two guns were, and where my silver teapot and a few other things were hidden” 
(Henry 99). 
Looting occurred throughout the different phases of revolution: at a time when large 
groups of armed individuals challenged government authority, it is clear how cases like large 
and small-scale larceny could occur. The pillage of Zacualpan took place in 1916, well into the 
second civil war between the Constitutionalists and the Conventionalists: by this time, the 
country had been in armed conflict for six years, and civilians were experiencing more acutely 
the effects of extended periods of warfare. 
Villa’s implementation of conscription into his forces in 1916 was one manifestation of 
this escalation. During the first phase of popular revolt and the period of civil war between 
Huerta and the Constitutionalists, the revolutionary forces were largely made up of volunteers. 
During the civil war between the Conventionalists and the Constitutionalists, particularly in 
the latter days of Villa’s continued insurgency following his defeat at Celaya, troops began to 
be amassed forcibly. The account of Jesús Avila from Aquellos Años de la Revolución describes his 
forced service: “Villa issued a decree in the State of Chihuahua [in 1916]. Every male member 
of a family was to serve in his troops. I was barely fifteen years old” (qtd. in Kallas 265-266). 
Additionally, Maria Villasaña Lopez was abducted from her home at the age of 14 in 1916 by 
Villista forces, and her account demonstrates how conscription was experienced by a young 
woman during the revolution: 
Before they left the area, General Bonilla kidnapped me and another officer took my 
younger sister from our home. My mother wept and pleaded for them to leave us with 
her, but not our tears, our panic, or our screams helped at all. I was given a rifle just like 
the other women […] I did help in washing the wounds of the soldiers and in caring 
for the sick. Many times we were half naked from making bandages with our clothes. 
(Kallas 367)
Both Avila’s and López’s accounts makes it apparent that conscription became a hated 
condition of the warfare in the Mexican Revolution as it dragged on and as it drained 
resources, even in terms of human lives and labor. 
 All in all, the appropriation of civilian resources by the different armies of the 
revolution occurred in a variety of ways. Certain aspects were present throughout the conflict, 
while others developed as the tactics used by revolutionaries to achieve order in government 
became harsher. However, one constant was the effect that this exploitation had on civilians 
themselves. Although life under El Porfiriatio certainly negatively impacted a large percentage 
of the Mexican population, the years of protracted warfare, increased consumption of 
resources, and the fear produced by living under constant threat of occupation during the 
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Mexican Revolution had an increasingly debilitating effect on México’s people. By the end of 
the period of mass armed conflict in 1917, a significant portion of the hundreds of thousands of 
deaths seen in the revolution could likely be attributed to the increased material, physical, and 
psychological strain on civilians and civilian resources caused by the developments in war.  
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Mexican Revolution exemplifies the concept of total war manifested 
on multiple levels. Through the examination of the degree of violence used by combatants, the 
failure to protect non-combatants from harm, and the complete absorption of civilian resources 
and other areas of life, it becomes apparent that this was an armed conflict unrestricted in its 
methods of war. Furthermore, as the revolution dragged on, the various factions involved 
became more and more willing to engage in practices of total war. 
There are various reasons as to why the revolution escalated to a conflict of total 
war proportions, including, as I have demonstrated, the greater implementation of heavier 
weaponry, more brutal military tactics, and the extended duration of the revolution. However, 
examining various sources reveals that one of the biggest factors in producing total war in 
the Revolution was ideological difference: those existing both between revolutionaries and 
the counterrevolutionary ideology of the federal governments, and between the various 
revolutionary forces themselves. Once the call for popular rebellion was put forth in 1910, 
many of the revolutionary forces that answered it did so with the shared belief in their need 
to overthrow El Porfiriato, return the nation to a state of democracy, and end the exploitation 
of México’s campesinos and working-class peoples. The first two goals were achieved 
within the first year of the revolution, but the goal of extensive social and economic reform 
slipped out of reach once the country saw the return to the Porfirismo-style of government 
following Huerta’s overthrow of Madero. Thus, upon entering into civil war with Huerta, the 
revolutionaries committed themselves to deposing his regime by any means necessary, so as 
to cancel Madero’s mistakes that prevented reform at the national level. On the other side, 
Huerta viewed the revolutionaries’ movement for social and political change as being wholly 
unfounded, he himself desiring a return to the Porfirismo that he believed to be the correct 
governance and social order for the country. To bring this about, he attempted to crush the 
revolutionary movement as swiftly and absolutely as possible in order to return civil order to 
the country. Both parties therefore escalated their methods and measures of warfare to that of 
total war proportions. 
The later civil war between the Constitutionalists and the Conventionalists followed 
similar lines. The Convention of Aguascalientes in 1914 attempted to unify the various 
political, social, and economic desires proposed by the numerous revolutionary forces that 
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composed the Constitutionalists and their allies. The failure of the convention exposed 
the irreconcilable differences within the revolutionary movement, and prompted a return 
to warfare that would essentially rehash the conflict played out between Huerta and the 
Constitutionalists for control of the country (Knight 2: 261-264). Exacerbated further by 
the increasing popular sense that the revolution was turning into a perpetual war, the 
revolutionaries reengaged in methods invoking total war in an attempt to seize power as 
quickly as possible. The escalation in warfare between Villa’s Conventionalists and Obregon’s 
Constitutionalists, as well as the rapid revision of the constitution in 1917, demonstrates the 
Constitutionalists’ desire to expedite their version of governmental order and stability (Knight 
2: 470). Therefore, ideological differences between the various sides of the revolution largely 
motivated their engagement in total war methods, with the view that doing so would allow 
them to prevent the triumph of the opposition’s control of Mexican affairs. That being said, 
other factors certainly contributed to the development of total war, which is a subject that 
should be further explored in the future. 
This essay demonstrates the need for more research devoted to the Mexican Revolution, 
its military history, and how this conflict affected and was experienced by those who lived 
through it. Furthermore, greater consideration should be given to the Mexican Revolution and 
its place in the historiography of the concept of total war. The case of the Mexican Revolution 
provides an example in which, through contemporary definitions of total warfare, we are able 
to examine a revolution through the lens of a concept typically only associated with Western 
wars. Therefore, this concept’s scope could be widened to describe other global revolutions or 
mass armed conflicts, both in the past, and in more contemporary contexts.
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